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INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) requires a corporate employer

to deduct and withhold federal income taxes, and social security taxes 2
from its employees' wages. The corporate employer is liable for pay-

@1991, Allen J. Littman. All rights reserved.
*J.D., 1984, University of Miami; LL.M. (Taxation), 1990, University of Florida. Allen J.
Littman practices law with the firm of Roberts & Holland, New York, New York and
Washington, D.C.
1. I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (1988) (unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Internal
Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for 1988).
The requirement extends to all employers, not just corporations, but since the subject matter
discussed herein pertains predominantly to corporations, corporations will be largely referenced.
2. I.R.C. § 3102(a).
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ment of those taxes to the Internal Revenue Service (the Service or
IRS) 2 The I.R.C. requires these funds to be held as "special fund[s]
in trust for the United States. ' 4 These funds are often referred to as
"trust funds." Predictably, some corporate employers may fail to
satisfy this trust fund requirement or may abuse the trust fund. One
possible scenario is an employer in financial difficulty using the trust
fund as a source of financial first aid. 5 In another scenario, an employer
may have only sufficient funds to pay employees their wages net of
withholding taxes, and lack the funds to set aside withholding taxes
for the trust fund. In such cases, the individual persons who are
required to collect, account for or pay over the trust fund taxes are
liable for a penalty (referred to herein as the "one hundred percent
penalty") equal to the amount of tax evaded, not collected, or not
accounted for and paid over.6 These individual persons, known as
"responsible persons," may include officers, employees or other per7
sons controlling the corporate employer.
A corporation experiencing financial difficulty, such as in the above
examples, probably will be unable to rescue itself by the described
actions, which amount to simply exchanging one creditor for another.
Eventually, the corporation could be forced to seek protection from
its creditors, including the IRS, under the reorganization provisions
contained in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 8 Using the trust
funds to maintain the business or paying a "net payroll" is likely to
be a last resort for the employer, due to the one hundred percent
penalty as well as potential criminal liability.9 Therefore, it is possible
that the corporation would have other substantial liabilities to the
IRS, including regular corporate income taxes 10 and the corporation's
own one-half share of the social security taxes. 1 The corporate debtor
in a chapter 11 proceeding may wish to relieve the responsible persons
of their liability for the trust fund taxes and the one hundred percent

3. I.R.C. § 3403 (income taxes); I.R.C. § 3102(b) (social security).
4. I.R.C. § 7501(a).
5. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978).
6. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (West Supp. 1990). See Slodov, 436 U.S. at 245.
7. I.R.C. § 6671(b).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1146 (1988). Under chapter 11, a debtor may continue to operate its
business and its debts may be adjusted or paid under a plan of reorganization, which is voted
on by its creditors and approved by the bankruptcy court in a complex confirmation process. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 7202.
10. See I.R.C. § 11 (imposing corporate income taxes).
11. I.R.C. § 3111. These are actually excise taxes, imposed upon employers, based upon
the employees' wages. They are imposed at the same rates as the social security taxes imposed
upon the employees. See I.R.C. § 3101.
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penalty. In order to do this, the debtor may designate, within or
without its plan of reorganization, that its payments to the IRS of
prebankruptcy tax debts will be applied first to its liability for trust
fund taxes. The IRS has objected uniformly to these designations,
since they increase the risk of nonpayment of non-trust fund taxes.'?
The increased risk arises because, while the IRS can turn to the
responsible persons for payments of the trust fund taxes, the IRS has
no collateral source for payment of non-trust fund taxes analogous to
the responsible persons. The ensuing litigation has produced a kaleidoscope of judicial opinions, results and rationales. The Supreme Court
decided the issue in the combined cases of United States v. Energy
Resources Co. and United States v. Newport Offshore, Ltd. 13 Energy
Resources holds that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order
designation
the IRS to apply a payment to trust fund liabilities if the
14
is "necessary for the success of a reorganization plan.'
A related issue arises when the corporation initially fails to collect
or pay over to the IRS the trust fund taxes, but later pays the trust
fund taxes within ninety days before filing a bankruptcy petition. In
such circumstances, the issue is whether the payment is a preference
which a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession in the bankruptcy
proceedings may recover from the Service. 15 If the payment is not
recovered, then it will serve to reduce the liability of the responsible
person commensurately. The Supreme Court also recently decided this
issue in Begier v. Internal Revenue Service,16 which holds that a voluntary prebankruptcy payment to the IRS, designated by the corporation as a payment of trust fund taxes, cannot be recovered from
17
the Service as a preference.
Taken together, Energy Resources and Begier offer a debtor approaching bankruptcy the flexibility to relieve the responsible person
of the trust fund liability, either prior to bankruptcy, as in Begier, or
through a reorganization, as in Energy Resources. However, in Energy
Resources, the Supreme Court allowed special priority treatment for
trust fund liabilities in a chapter 11 case,' 8 a result which is inconsistent

12. United States v. Energy Resources Co., 110 S. Ct. 2139, 2141 (1990).
13. Id. at 2139.
14. Id. at 2140.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988) (governing preferences and permitting a bankruptcy trustee
or debtor in possession to avoid and recover a transfer made to a creditor on the eve of
bankruptcy if the effect of the transfer is to give that creditor a larger distribution than the
creditor would have otherwise received through bankruptcy liquidation proceedings).
16. 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990).
17. Id. at 2267.
18. Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2140.
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with the longstanding bankruptcy law principle that equal priority
claims must be treated alike. 19 Moreover, given the holding of Energy
Resources, which permits designation in a chapter 11 plan, Begier
could have the ultimate effect of reducing the total revenue the IRS
collects. This is because a voluntary prebankruptcy payment of trust
fund taxes by the corporation will eliminate or reduce the Service's
alternative source of collection, the responsible person.
The balance of this article will address the issues raised by the
various judicial opinions and the litigants' positions in these cases.
First, the generally applicable tax and bankruptcy law will be reviewed. Second, the article will address the various judicial approaches
to the problems and criticize them where appropriate. Third, the article will offer alternative solutions which the government, the taxpayers, and the courts to date, including the Supreme Court, have
overlooked. Finally, the article will discuss the interaction, sometimes
unexpected, between the designation and preference issues.

II.

TAX AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO
TRUST FUND LIABILITY AND TO THE ONE HUNDRED PERCENT
PENALTY

A.

Tax Law

I. R.C. section 3402(a) requires an employer to deduct and withhold
from its employees' wages the employees' income taxes attributable
to those wages.2 0 I.R.C. section 3102(a) imposes a similar obligation
upon an employer with respect to employees' social security and medicare taxes imposed under I.R.C. section 3101.21 Sections 3403 and
3102(b) create employer liability for the employees' income, social security, and medicare taxes which the I.R.C. requires the employer
to deduct and withhold.- These taxes, when collected or withheld,
are "held to be a special fund in trust for the United States," pursuant
to I.R.C. section 7501(a).? No general requirement exists that requires
these taxes be held in a segregated bank account.24

19.
R.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a'(4) (1988); G. TREISTER, J.

LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS

OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

TROST,

L.

FORMAN,

K.

KLEE &

§ 9.03(b) (2d ed. 1988).

20. I.R.C. § 3402(a).
21. I.R.C. § 3102(a).
22. I.R.C. §§ 3403, 3102(b).
23. I.R.C. § 7501(a). The history of those provisions is straightforward. I.R.C. §§ 1622(a),
1623 (1939) (withheld income taxes) (current versions at I.R.C. §§ 3402(a), 3403), were enacted
by the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, § 2(a), 57 Stat. 126, 128, 137. I.R.C. § 1401
(1939) (social security taxes) (current version at I.R.C. § 3102, was originally enacted by the
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 802(a), 49 Stat. 636).
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Beyond the employer's liability, I.R.C. section 6672(a) imposes a
penalty upon "persons" who willfully fail to collect these trust fund
taxes, willfully fail to account truthfully for and pay over these taxes,
dr willfully attempt to evade or defeat these taxes.2 The penalty
imposed is equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, not collected,
or not accounted for and paid over.- Further, section 6671 makes it
clear that the IRS assesses and collects the penalty in the same manner
as a tax.Y
The "responsible persons" referred to in section 6672 include officers and corporate employees.2 The responsible person concept had
its genesis in the Revenue Act of 1918, section 1308(a),2 in substantially the same form as it exists in current section 6672(a).30 As a final

I.R.C. § 7501 was first enacted, in substantially current form, in the Act of May 10, 1934,
ch. 277, § 607, 48 Stat. 768. The legislative history to § 607 of the Act of May 10, 1934 indicates
that the provision imposes the amount of taxes withheld or collected with a trust and makes
applicable for the enforcement of the government's claim the administrative provisions for assessment and collection of taxes. S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1934).
24. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2264. See I.R.C. § 7512 (requiring the employer to deposit trust
funds in a segregated bank account upon demand by the Service) (added by Pub. L. No. 85-321,
72 Stat. 5 (1958)).
25. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (West Supp. 1990).
26. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 6671(a).
28. I.R.C. § 6671(b).
29. The Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § -1308(a), 40 Stat. 1143.
30. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (West Supp. 1990). The Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1308(a), 40
Stat. 1143, referred to other types of taxes required to be collected by a third party and paid
to the government, such as certain taxes on transportation, cigars and cigarettes, and admission
tickets. The Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1017(d), 43 Stat. 344, strengthened the provision
by changing the "willfully refuses" language to "willfully fails."
The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 807(c), 49 Stat. 638, made the responsible person
penalty, as well as the "trust fund" provision, applicable to the social security taxes withheld
from employees. The Int. Rev. Code of 1939 contained the same 100% penalty within the
respective substantive law titles relating to admissions and dues, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §
1718(c), 53 Stat. 193, documents and playing cards, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 182 1(a)(3), 53
Stat. 202, narcotics, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 2557(b)(4), 53 Stat. 275, and handguns, Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 2707(a), 53 Stat. 290. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1430, 53 Stat. 178, made the
100% penalties contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 1821(a), 2707(a), 53 Stat. 202, 290,
applicable to employment taxes. When federal income tax withholding was enacted in 1943, see
supra note 17, Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, § 1627, 57 Stat. 138, was added to make all
laws applicable to withheld taxes, including penalties, which applied to the social security taxes,
including the penalties referenced by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 1430, 53 Stat. 178.
When the Code was recodified in 1954, I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1954) (amended 1978, 1989), simply
continued the 100% penalty imposed by existing law.
It is, therefore, apparent that congressional policy underlying the 100% penalty and the
'trust fund" nature of these taxes has been longstanding and consistent. The force of these
statutes is justified by the fact that the United States credits the employees' tax liabilities even

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

major component of the enforcement system, I.R.C. section 7202 imposes criminal penalties upon responsible persons for failure to collect
or truthfully account for and pay over trust fund taxes.'
Despite the section 6671(a) prescription that the Service assess
and collect the one hundred percent penalty in the same manner as
a tax, nothing in the Code actually prohibits the collection of the one
hundred percent penalty from responsible persons in addition to collection of the actual tax liability from the employer. Nevertheless, the
IRS's policy is to use the one hundred percent penalty "only as a
collection device . . .[and that] the withheld income and employment
taxes or collected excise taxes will be collected only once, whether
from the corporation, from one or more of its responsible persons, or
from the corporation and one or more of its responsible persons. '32
The Service is somewhat less generous in its application of corporate payments to trust fund liabilities. Generally, the policy of the
Service is to honor a taxpayer's designation of a payment to a particular
tax if the payment is "voluntary. "- If trust fund liabilities are involved,
the Service considers any payment made on the corporate account to
represent payment of the employer (non-trust fund) portions of the

if the employer fails to pay their taxes required to be withheld. In re Technical Knockout
Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783
F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986). Although this article focuses on employment taxes and employees' income taxes withheld, it applies equally to all other "trust fund" taxes.
31. I.R.C. § 7202. This penalty was initially enacted as a maximum penalty of $1,000 or
one year imprisonment. Revenue Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1004, 40 Stat. 325-26. The
monetary penalty was increased to $10,000 by the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1308(b), 40
Stat. 1143, and was later made a felony punishable by imprisonment of up to five years by the
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234. § 1017(b), 43 Stat. 344. Interestingly, despite inflation, the
monetary penalty today remains at $10,000.
32. 100-Percent Penalty Assessments, 1 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH) P-5-60, at 1305-14
(May 30, 1984). To ensure that it will be able either to retain funds collected from a responsible
person or that the statute of limitations on collection against the corporation will not expire,
the Service will generally continue to pursue collection against the corporation until the expiration
of the period for filing a claim for refund by the person or persons from whom the 100% penalty
was collected. Id. When that statute of limitations expires, the tax assessment against the
corporation will be abated. Id. In addition, the IRS will abate the 100% penalty to the extent
that further trust fund taxes are collected from the corporation. Abatements, 2 Int. Rev. Man.
(Admin.) (CCH) 5638.1(2), at 6S21 (Nov. 21, 1989). See In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning,
861 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988) (because responsible person may still file for a refund, IRS may
not ignore designation provision in chapter 11 plan even though currently the 100% penalty has
been paid), dismissed as moot, 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1987) (responsible person may be assessed without collection action against employer).
33. Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83, modifying Rev. Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 C.B. 43; see Rev.
Proc. 84-58, 1984-2 C.B. 501.
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liability, unless it is a voluntary payment and the taxpayer designates
a different application of the payment.3 In the latter case, the Service
follows the taxpayer's designation.
The term "voluntary," when applied to a taxpayer's payment,
means not "involuntary." The IRS Manual defines an "involuntary"
payment as one made "when the taxpayer has no immediate control
over its source. '' 3s The Manual offers three examples of involuntary
payment, two of which are relevant here: "(a) distraint action by
Service personnel (notice of levy, levy, etc.)" and "(b) distribution of
proceeds resulting from a court order pursuant to a claim or other
legal action to which the United States is a party. ''1 7 Payments received
from a bankruptcy proceeding are considered to be involuntary " and
are, therefore, applied to attain the "maximum benefit for the United
States" unless there is specific statutory direction 9 Thus, the Service
consistently has maintained the position that it, and not a court, has
the sole power to designate the application of an involuntary payment.
The Service's logic that it alone has the power to designate the
application of involuntary payments for the United States's benefit
prevailed in the seminal case of Amos v. Commissioner.40 Amos was
a nonbankruptcy case in which the debtor argued that a payment
collected by levy and distraint, which the parties agreed was involuntary, must be applied as a matter of law first to interest, rather than
principal. 41 The Tax Court, however, held that the payment must be
applied as the Service elected, to principal first, as a matter of administrative necessity and convenience. 42 Significantly, although the Tax
Court found that a creditor's right to direct the application of an

34. 100-Percent Penalty Assessments, 1 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH) P-5-60, at 1305-14
(May 30, 1984); Employer (Corporate) Payments, 2 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH)
56(18)3.1(1)(a), at 6910 (Nov. 21, 1989).
35. Voluntary Payment, 2 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH) 56(18)6.1(1), at 6911 (Oct. 21,
1988). In the absence of taxpayer designation, a voluntary payment will be applied by the
Service "in a manner serving its best interest." Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83, modifying
Rev. Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 C.B. 43. Courts approve of this. See Liddon v. United States, 448
F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
36. Involuntary Payments, 2 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH) 56(18)6.2(1), at 6911-3 (Nov.
15, 1985).
37. Id.
38. Application of Payments Received From Proceedings, 2 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH)
57(13)4.3, at 7451-3 (Dec. 7, 1988).
39. Involuntary Payments, 2 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH) 56(18)6.2(2), at 6911-3 (Nov.
15, 1985).
40. 47 T.C. 65 (1966),
41. Id. at 68.
42. Id. at 70 (citing O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir. 1964)).
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involuntary payment was a minority common law view, 43 it favorably
cited an earlier case which "emphasized that the relationship between
the United States and a delinquent taxpayer is not that of an ordinary
debtor and creditor, '' 4 and refused to follow the majority general
debtor-creditor rule.
In Amos, the Tax Court apparently accepted in full the Service's
definition of "involuntary payment. '' 45 The Amos court relied heavily
on O'Dell v. United States,46 a bankruptcy liquidation case decided
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. O'Dell held that the bankruptcy
court had no power or jurisdiction to direct the application of funds
held in the registry of the bankruptcy court which resulted from the
liquidation of property by judicial sale.47 By adopting the second prong
of the Service's definition of "involuntary payment" as one resulting
"from a legal proceeding in which the Government is seeking to collect
its delinquent taxes or file a claim therefor, ''1 s however, Amos may
have extended O'Dell beyond its holding. The mortgage foreclosure
and the seizure and sale of property held by the bankrupt created the
fund in O'Dell 9 Thus, the operative fact in O'Dell may have been the
judicial foreclosure sale and the seizure and sale by the IRS, rather
than the fact that the sale proceeds, placed in the registry of the
bankruptcy court, were subject to the government's claim in that legal
proceeding.- Furthermore, the government had neither brought a
legal proceeding to collect taxes in Amos nor filed a claim. More
importantly, however, O'Dell involved a liquidation bankruptcy, not
a reorganization, and Amos was a nonbankruptcy case. Therefore,
any direct application of O'Dell or Amos to a reorganization is questionable.
Muntwyler v. United States ' applied the Amos and O'Dell holdings
in the context of the one hundred percent penalty. In Muntwyler, a
corporation owing both trust fund and non-trust fund taxes assigned

43. Id. at 69.
44. Id. at 70 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 599 (1934)).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
46. 326 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1964).
47. Id. at 456.
48. Amos, 47 T.C. at 69.
49. O'Dell, 326 F.2d at 454.
50. The O'Dell court's brief explanation supports this view: "As a general rule, a debtor
voluntarily paying his debt may direct the application of his money to such items or demands
as he chooses. But, such is not the case where, as here, the payment is made involuntarily as
in an execution or judicial sale." Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
51. 703 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983).
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all of its assets to a common law trustee (assignee) for the benefit of
creditors. The court authorized the trustee to sell company assets and
pay claims. 52 The IRS filed a claim for both trust fund and non-trust
fund taxes with the trustee. The trustee made a partial payment to
the IRS and directed that it be applied to the trust -fund liability.The IRS refused to honor the trustee's instructions and instead allocated the entire amount to the non-trust fund liability. Accordingly,
the IRS assessed the trust fund liability against Muntwyler, who was
a responsible person under I.R.C. section 6672.5
The Muntwyler court recognized and accepted as sensible tax policy
both the voluntary-involuntary distinction and the Service's sole power
to allocate an involuntary payment, stating that the rule had been
"uniformly followed by the courts." The sole question was whether
or not the trustee's payment was voluntary. The Service contended
that its submission of a claim to the trustee was an administrative
action, like a levy, sufficient to meet the Amos definition of an involuntary payment. 57 The court rejected the Service's contention. It stated
that the presence of court action or administrative action resulting in
actual seizure of property was necessary to render a payment involuntary.58 No seizure of property or enforced collection measures were
taken in Muntwyler. The court distinguished prior cases in which
9
actual court action was involved.5

52. Id. at 1031.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1031-32.
56. Id. at 1032. See also Arnone v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9356 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (holding that the Service properly exercised its power to allocate involuntary payments); United States v. DeBeradinis, 395 F. Supp. 944, 952 (D. Conn. 1975) (finding that the
Service properly allocated involuntary payments, and citing cases supporting that proposition),
affd mem., 538 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1976); Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65 (1966) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 40-51). But see cases cited infra note 59.
57. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1032.
58. Id. at 1033.
59. Id. In In re Hart's Transfer & Storage, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 579, 631 P.2d 258 (1981),
the debtor had made a voluntary bulk sale of assets. The sale proceeds were deposited into the
registry of the court by the auctioneer, who filed an interpleader action. Id. at 579, 631 P.2d
at 259. The government filed a claim in the interpleader action. Id. at 579, 631 P.2d at 260.
Citing O'Dell and Amos, the court held that the payments were involuntary due to the fact
that the court had the power to decide the amount due each creditor and the priority of payments
as among creditors. Id. at 582-84, 631 P.2d at 261-62. Because the payments were involuntary,
the court had no power to instruct the IRS how to apply the payment as between trust fund
and non-trust fund liability. Id. at 583-84, 631 P.2d at 262.
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Muntwyler aptly demonstrates how the voluntary-involuntary
dichotomy can become the focal point of litigants' arguments with
regard to the application of payments to trust fund liabilities by the
IRS. By making a "voluntary" payment, a debtor can designate its
payment to be applied to trust fund liabilities, thus reducing the responsible person's liability for the one hundred percent penalty under
section 6672. If the payment is deemed involuntary, then neither the
debtor nor a court can order the IRS to apply the payment in any
particular manner, at least in the absence of a "specific statutory
directive" to the contrary. 60 However, initiation of bankruptcy proceedings alters these governing principles.
B.

Bankruptcy Law

The Bankruptcy Code61 contains liquidation provisions (chapter 7),6
reorganization provisions (chapter 11),- and provisions common to
both.64 The commencement of any bankruptcy case creates an estate,
which consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property . . . wherever located and by whomever held." The estate
includes "[a]ny interest, in property that the estate acquires after the
commencement of the case, ' 66 but excludes "[p]roperty in which the
debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only legal title and

In First Nat'l City Bank Y. Kline, the court took the opposing view that payments in
bankruptcy were involuntary because they are made under judicial order, and, therefore, the
court had exclusive authority to apply the funds as "equity and justice require." First Nat'l
City Bank v. Kline, 439 F. Supp. 726, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The "equitable solution" was "to
apply repayments ratably, to all the debts." Id. The Muntwyler court distinguished First Nat'l
on the grounds that First Nat'l involved court action. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1033. However,
First Nat'l is better distinguished from Muntwyler because First Nat'l did not involve tax
debts, and therefore, the rationale of Amos and O'Dell (adopting the minority view as to taxes)
did not apply in FirstNat'l, and the general common law did apply. Moreover, neither Muntuyler
nor First Nat'l involved a reorganization. The Muntwyler court did state as dicta that the
"Government might have been correct in its claim [that the payment was involuntary] if the
corporation had been in bankruptcy, which it was not." Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1034 n.2.
60. Involuntary Payments, 2 Int. Rev. Man. (Admin.) (CCH) 56(18)6.2(2), at 6911-3 (Nov.
15, 1985).
61. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
62. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728 (1988).
63. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1988).
64. Chapters 1, 3 and 5 of title 11, United States Code apply in a case under chapter 7
(liquidation) or chapter 11 (reorganization). 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198,
208-09 (1983) (estate includes property of the debtor seized by the IRS prior to bankruptcy).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (1988).
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not an equitable interest . ... '67 Consequently, the bankruptcy estate
will not include the beneficial interest in property the debtor holds in
trust for another.
In chapter 7, a trustee administers the bankruptcy estate,6 while
in chapter 11, the debtor generally administers the estate, 69 unless a
trustee has been appointed. 70 In either chapter 7 or chapter 11, however, the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession may recover
certain prebankruptcy 7' or postbankruptcy transfers2 of the debtor's
property for the benefit of the estate.73 A preference, one of these
avoidable prebankruptcy transfers, is a transfer of the debtor's property to or for the benefit of a creditor 74 on account of an antecedent
debt, 75 made while the debtor is insolvent 76 and within ninety days
before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition,- which enables
the creditor to receive more than it would otherwise receive in a
chapter 7 distribution.7 8
A preferential transfer, therefore, must consist of the "property
of the debtor," which is "that property that would have been part of
the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings. ' 7 9 Consequently, if the debtor holds property
in trust for another and transfers that property to the beneficiary
(even if the beneficiary is also a creditor), it is axiomatic that the
property transferred is not the debtor's property under bankruptcy
law because it would not have been "property of the estate" had it
not been transferred. Therefore, the beneficiary did not receive a
preferential transfer. °
In chapter 7, the trustee collects and sells the property of the
estate and distributes the funds to creditors according to a priority

67. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1988).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
69. Known as the debtor in possession. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
71. - 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547, 548 (1988).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1988).
73. 11 U.S.C. §§ 550(a), 551 (1988).
74. 11 U.S.c. § 547(b)(1) (1988).
75. 11 U.S.c. § 547(b)(2) (1988). The regular, timely payment of any tax cannot be "on
account of' an antecedent debt and, therefore, is not a preference because a tax is not deemed
incurred until the last day the tax is payable without penalty. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(4) (1988).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988). Insolvency is presumed during the 90 days immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1988).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
79. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2263.
80. Id.
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scheme set forth in both chapter 7 and chapter 5.A1 Generally, in
chapter 7, the trustee pays priority claims listed in chapter 5 before
general unsecured claims 2 The Bankruptcy Code establishes seven
levels of priority claims, and the trustee must pay each claim of a
certain priority before any claim of a lower priority is paid.- The
Bankruptcy Code reserves seventh priority for income taxes due
within three years before the commencement of the bankruptcy case,8
trust fund taxes payable by either the employer or by a responsible
person,- employment taxes (employer's share) due within three years
before the commencement of the bankruptcy case s6 and certain other
taxes not relevant here. s 7 If sufficient funds are not available to satisfy
all claims within a priority category, then the trustee must make
payments pro rata among claims within that priority category. 8
In chapter 11, the debtor, or a trustee if one has been appointed,
continues to operate the business. 89 The debtor generally has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization within the first 120 days

81. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988). One of the functions of the
preference provisions is to protect the statutory priorities of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) and to ensure
equitable distribution of the estate. See Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2263; Coral Petroleum, Inc. v.
Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1986); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6138.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1988).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (1988).
85. "[A] tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in
whatever capacity." 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(C) (1988). This priority includes the 100% penalty in
a bankruptcy proceeding of the responsible person. See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268
(1978). Withheld taxes on wages earned, but not paid, within 90 days of bankruptcy receive
third priority along with the wages. See Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974); 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(3) (1988).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(D) (1988).
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A), (B), (E), (F), (G) (1988).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988). The clear statutory directive of 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) overrides
the voluntary-involuntary distinction. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. It is odd,
indeed, that cases confronting this very fact pattern have not focused upon U.S.C. § 726(b).
See In re Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 88 Bankr. 41 (D. Vt. 1988) (payment involuntary if in
chapter 7); In re Office Dynamics, Inc., 39 Bankr. 760 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (chapter 7
liquidation is sufficient judicial action to render debtor's payment involuntary); see also In re
Leonard, 112 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (recognizing effect of 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) on
IRS allocation, and citing Vernwnt Fiberglassand Office Dynamics, supra, but failing to recognize the erroneous absence of 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) in the two cases). But see In re Leonard, 1990
Bankr. LEXIS 2174 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (in later proceeding court ruled that 11 U.S.C. §
726(b) "may not apply" if there is only one creditor, even if that creditor has more than one claim).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988) (appointment of trustee).
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after the commencement of the bankruptcy caseA° Thus, the debtor
is generally, at least initially, in control of both the business of the
debtor and the legal proceedings. The plan proposes the treatment of
various claims or classes of claims and holders of claims or interests
vote on the plan. 91 The bankruptcy court will confirm the plan if it
meets certain minimum requirements. 92 One of the requirements is
that a holder of a seventh priority tax claim must receive "deferred
cash payments" of the entire amount of the claim, plus interest, over
a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of the
claim.9 No provisions in the Bankruptcy Code specifically address the
application of prebankruptcy or chapter 11 tax payments between
trust fund and non-trust fund liabilities.94 Consequently, the courts
have attempted to address the issue of payment application, and as
might be expected, have arrived at a variety of conclusions.

90. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a)-(b) (1988). A creditor may file a plan of reorganization if a trustee
has been appointed or if the debtor fails to propose a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988).
91. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1126 (1988). Generally a class of claims has accepted the plan
if the claimants accepting the plan hold claims totaling at least two-thirds of the value of the
class' claims and more than one-half of the number of total claims in the class. 11 U.S.C. §
1126(c) (1988).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988). Creditors holding secured non-priority claims or general unsecured claims whose classes have not accepted the plan and whose contract rights are not
reinstated and who are not paid off in cash in full immediately upon confirmation of the plan
may have certain of their legal rights altered under the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988). Seventh priority tax claims are listed in 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(7) and in supra text accompanying notes 84-87. If the tax has not yet been assessed at
the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy case, assessment, as well as the commencement
or continuation of a proceeding in Tax Court, is automatically stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(6),
(8) (1988). However, the Service may file a claim in the bankruptcy case despite the pendency
of a tax court case, I.R.C. § 6871(c)(1), and the bankruptcy court may determine a tax. See 11
U.S.C. § 505(a) (1988). After the bankruptcy court has determined the tax, the Service may
assess the tax despite the automatic stay and irrespective of the restrictions on assessments
under I.R.C. § 6213(a). 11 U.S.C. § 505(c) (1988); I.R.C. § 6871(b)(2). Thus, the maximum
stretchout of payments from the time of confirmation of a plan of reorganization may be somewhat
less than six years if the tax is assessed before the commencement of the bankruptcy case or
before the confirmation of the plan, and somewhat more than six years if the tax is not assessed
until after the plan is confirmed by the court.
94. Proposed H.R. 3984, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1988), which would have added 11
U.S.C. § 505(d), provided that "[p]ayments of taxes under this title to a governmental unit may
be applied by the governmental unit in a manner that preserves alternative sources of collection,
if any." The bill, of course, would have permitted the IRS to apply all funds received in a
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding to non-trust fund liabilities in order to preserve the liability
of any responsible persons. It is not clear what effect the bill would have had upon the specific
statutory requirement of pro rata distribution of equal priority taxes under 11 U.S.C. § 726(b)
(1988).
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PREBANKRUPTCY VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS OF TRUST FUNDS

A.

Judicial Solutions

Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the case
law regarding payment of trust funds 95 to the IRS in the ninety-day
period prior to bankruptcy wavered between two alternatives. One
group of cases overrode the trust provisions of I.R.C. section 7501(a)
in favor of the statutory bankruptcy priorities.9 6 The other group of
cases recognized the trust, but required strict tracing of the funds
either to a segregated account 97 or to an account containing general
funds commingled with trust funds. 98
Post-1978 case law remained divided on whether the preference
(and therefore the priority) provisions overrode the trust provisions
of I.R.C. section 7501(a) and to what extent, if any, tracing was
required. The leading cases relaxed the pre-Code standard. However,
they differ on the degree of relaxation of the tracing burden.The Supreme Court reduced the uncertainty in this area in Begier.'°° In Begier, the IRS required the debtor, which had fallen behind
in its trust fund tax payments, to deposit all future trust fund taxes
in a separate bank account. 101 The debtor did not deposit sufficient

95. All of the cases cited in infra notes 96-98 addressed the issue of whether withheld tax
funds could be traced to property held by the debtor after bankruptcy - in other words,
whether funds were property of the estate under pre-Code law or were deemed held in trust.
They are not preference cases. However, since the concept of "property of the estate" enlightens
the preference provisions, they are relevant in that context as well. See supra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text.
96. See United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971); In re Shakesteers Coffee Shops,
546 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); In re Tamasha Town & Country
Club, 483 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1973).
97. See United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971) (cited for both propositions); In re
Glynn Wholesale Bldg. Materials, Inc., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9469 (S.D. Ga. 1978); In
re Progress Tech Colleges, Inc., 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9555 (S.D. Ohio 1977); In re Rohar
Assocs., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
98. Lusk Corp. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 462 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1972).
99. Compare Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 878 F.2d 762, 766 (1st Cir. 1989) (significant
relaxation), affd, 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990) with Drabkin v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1102,
1106 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (moderate relaxation). See also In re Malmart Mortgage Co., 109 Bankr.
1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Olympic Foundry Co., 63 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 71 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Air Fla.
Sys., Inc., 50 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), affd, 56 Bankr. 732 (S.D. Fla. 1985), opinion
withdrawn, 68 Bankr. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Rodriguez, 50 Bankr. 576 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 45 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984).
100. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2258.
101. Id. at 2261. See supra note 24.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss4/4

14

Littman: Reasonable Assumptions, Reasonable Persons and Invisible Boomeran
BANKRUPTCY: PAYMENT OF TRUST FUND LIABILITIES

funds into the new account to cover its trust fund liabilities. However,
the debtor became current on these trust fund taxes by making voluntary payments to the Service both from the new, separate account
and from its general funds.1° The debtor filed a chapter 11 petition
within ninety days of the transfers. 103 The case was subsequently converted to a chapter 7 case. Begier, the chapter 7 trustee, sought to
recover the tax payments from the Service as preferences.' °0 The
lower courts in Begier agreed that the bankruptcy trustee could not
avoid the transfers of funds from the separate account because the
debtor held those funds in trust for the benefit of the IRS.10 5 The
lower courts disagreed about the prebankruptcy payments from the
debtor's general accounts.10 6
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the money "transferred from its general operating accounts to the IRS was property
that [the debtor] had held in trust for the IRS." ° First, the Court
examined the language of I.R.C. section 7501 and determined that
the debtor created the statutory trust at the time the wages were
paid, even if specific funds were neither sent to the IRS with the
relevant return nor placed in a segregated fund.1' 8 Next, the Court
described the section 7501 trust as one "radically different" from "a
common-law trust, in which the settlor sets aside particular property
as the trust res."10 9 A section 7501 trust, in contrast, created a trust
in an abstract "amount" not tied to particular assets. 110 Consequently,
common law tracing rules would not apply to a section 7501 trust.,' ,
Instead, the appropriate rules to determine whether trust fund
taxes not segregated in a separate account were held in trust, or were
property of the estate at the commencement of a bankruptcy case,

102. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2261. It is not clear from the Court's opinion whether the debtor
became current on all its trust fund taxes or simply remained current on its trust fund taxes

due after the IRS required their segregation.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2262. Despite the conversion to chapter 7, the 90-day preference period continues
to begin to run 90 days before the filing of the original chapter 11 petition. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a)
(1988).
105. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2262.
106. Id. The bankruptcy court and, on appeal, the district court, permitted the trustee to
avoid most of the payments made from the debtor's general accounts. Id. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Third Circuit's reversal of the district court. Id.
107. Id. at 2263.
108. Id. at 2263-64. See also supra note 24.
109. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2265.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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were "reasonable assumptions.1112 The same "reasonable assumptions"
applied for preference purposes to determine whether a prepetition
3
payment consisted of funds in trust or of the debtor's property."1
These "reasonable assumptions" would assist the Service in demonstrating that the withheld taxes were still in the debtor's possession
1 14
at the commencement of the case.
Drawing on the House Report to the Bankruptcy Code, the Court
identified the appropriate "reasonable assumption" as being that the
debtor's voluntary payment, albeit from general funds, established the
requisite nexus between the "amount" held in trust and the funds
paid.11 5 Simply put, under Begier, any voluntary prepetition payment
to the IRS which the debtor designates as a payment of trust fund
taxes is automatically deemed to consist of funds held in trust under
I.R.C. section 7501(a). Therefore, such a transfer of the debtor's property does not constitute a preference.
B.

Critique of Judicial Solutions and Approaches

In Begier, the Supreme Court created a new form of trust, a trust
not requiring a trust res, but instead tied to an abstract dollar figure.
Although freeing up the trust from the res requirement permitted the
court to jettison common law tracing rules, it is not at all clear that
Congress intended to create this new form of trust in 1934, when it
enacted the statutory predecessor to I.R.C. section 7501.116 If Congress
meant to create a new form of trust,1 1 7 one would expect that Congress
would have explained somewhere that the common law tracing rules
would not apply, particularly since the obvious purpose for creating

112. Id. at 2266 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 32,417 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) and
124 CONG. REC. 32,017 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6501, 6570). The "reasonable assumptions" overruled the strict
(or no) tracing rule of Randall, 401 U.S. at 513. See supra notes 96-97.
113. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2267.
114. Id. See legislative history cited in supra note 112.
115. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2267. The House Report stated:
A payment of withholding taxes constitutes a payment of money held in trust
under [the] Internal Revenue Code § 7501(a), and thus will not be a preference
because the beneficiary of the trust, the taxing authority, is in a separate class
with respect to those taxes, if they have been properly held for payment, as they
will have been if the debtor is able to make the payments.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5787, 6329.
116. See supra note 23.
117. The Court stated that "[tihe common law of trusts is not binding on Congress." Begier,
110 S. Ct. at 2265 n.4.
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that trust in the first place was to provide a vehicle for tracing funds
collected or withheld. Instead, to construe I.R.C. section 7501(a) as
permitting a trust without a res, the Court relied upon the House
Report to the Bankruptcy Code, and upon statements made by the
House floor manager for the bill that enacted the Bankruptcy Code
some forty-four years later. 118
The Court completely failed to address its own conflicting precedent
which interpreted section 7501 as requiring a res. In Slodov v. United
States,1 9 the IRS attempted to impose the one hundred percent penalty
upon the purchaser of all of the stock of a corporation which owed
trust fund taxes, on the ground that he failed to pay the trust fund
taxes with funds acquired by the corporation after he acquired control. 120 The IRS contended that section 7501 impressed a trust upon
all after-acquired cash of the corporation.' 12 In rejecting the Service's
claim, the Slodov Court discussed the relationship between I.R.C.
sections 6672 and 7501. The Court compared the language of section
7501, which limited the trust to "the amount of taxes withheld or
collected," with the language of section 6672, which imposed "liability
for a willful failure to collect as well as failure to pay over."? The
Court concluded that section 7501 required "a nexus between the funds
collected and the trust created ... consistent with the accepted principle of trust law requiring tracing of misappropriated trust funds into
the trustee's estate in order for an impressed trust to arise."' This
passage clearly defined a section 7501 trust as one subject to the
12
common law tracing rules traditionally used to identify the trust res.
Slodov also identified and discussed the dilemma faced by secured
creditors whose interests might be overtaken by a trust imposed upon
funds untraceable under the established common law principles.'2 Be-

118. This approach was criticized by the concurring opinion in Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2267-69
(Scalia, J., concurring). The majority interpretation arguably was rejected by the Congress
considering the Bankruptcy Code when it failed to enact the Senate version of 11 U.S.C. §
541(b)(3), which would have expressly exempted all withheld taxes from "property of the estate"
and superseded Randall, 401 U.S. at 513. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; S.
REP. No. 95-1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in Resnick & Wypyski, Bankrnptcy
Reform Act of 1978: A Legislative History, DOCUMENT 54 (1979).
119. 436 U.S. 238 (1978).
120. Id. at 241.
121. Id. at 255-56.
122. Id. at 256 (emphasis by the Court).
123. Id.
124. Accord In re Malmart Mortgage Co., 109 Bankr. 1, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
125. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 256-60. See also Malmart, 109 Bankr. at 7 (trust consisting of
untraceable funds is secret, floating lien).
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cause the Begier Court failed even to spot the issue, Begier offers the
courts no guidance on the issue concerning a direct conflict between
the IRS as beneficiary of a section 7501 trust and a secured creditor
asserting an interest in the same funds. This issue arises if a debtor
makes a voluntary payment of trust fund taxes from a bank account
which contains no traceable trust funds, but which is collateral subject
to a creditor's perfected security interest.121, If the debtor paid the
wages to which the trust fund taxes relate prior to the perfection of
the security interest, the "springing" trust Begier created could attach
at the time the debtor paid the related wages. The trust could be
impressed upon the cash the creditor relied on for the security interest.
Of course, the creditor's due diligence could prevent this situation
from arising.
A more significant problem Begier presents is the extent of the
new tracing burden. Under the traditional common law tracing rules
alluded to in Slodov and rejected by Begier, the debtor had to trace
funds in a commingled account back to the trust in order for the trust
to attach to those funds.127 If the debtor could trace trust funds into
a commingled account, the burden was on the wrongdoer (here, the
debtor) to show how much of the commingled account was not in
trust.'? If the amount remaining in the commingled account was less
than the amount of the trust funds originally commingled, all funds
in the account were deemed to be trust funds. 129 However, if the
debtor replenished the commingled account, the "lowest intermediate
balance" rule required that "the trust fund [was] thereby dissipated,
and [could not] be treated as reappearing in sums subsequently deposited to the credit of the same account."' 130 An exception to this rule
permitted trust restoration if actual intent existed to place the funds
3
in trust.' '
The Begier Court rejected these established common law principles
in favor of "reasonable assumptions.' ' 32 In addition to establishing the
126. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1987) (cash proceeds of collateral are subject to security
interest for 10 days; identifiable cash proceeds of collateral are subject to security interest
indefinitely).
127. See In re Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 50 Bankr. 653, 659 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), affd, 56 Bankr.
732 (S.D. Fla. 1985), opinion unthdrawn, 68 Bankr. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1986); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 424-26 (1973) (cited approvingly by Slodov, 436 U.S. at 256).
128. D. DOBBS, supra note 127, at 425.
129. Id.
130. Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U.S. 707, 710 (1914); D. DOBBS, supra note 116, at 425-26.
131. D. DOBBS, supra note 127, at 425. Such a transfer to a trust from general funds, if
made during the 90-day preference period, would itself be preferential under the common law
tracing principles.
132. See Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2258.
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automatic "springing" trust assumption, the Begier Court favorably
cited legislative history that states "where the debtor had commingled
that amount of withheld taxes in his general checking account, it might
be reasonable to assume that any remaining amounts in that account
on the commencement of the case are the withheld taxes.",- Although
it was unnecessary in Begier for the Court to clarify the extent of
this "postpetition reasonable assumption," the assumption could replace the lowest intermediate balance rule. All the Service would need
to do at the commencement of a bankruptcy case is to trace any
amount of withheld funds to a commingled account in order to reach
the entire amount of the account to the extent of the withheld funds
originally commingled. 1' 4 Fluctuations in the balance of the account
after the commingling of the withheld taxes and before the commencement of the bankruptcy case would be irrelevant under this reading
of Begier.13 However, with respect to prepetition payments, Begier
took the "reasonable assumption" one step further by failing to require
any tracing of withheld taxes to the general fund. 136

IV.

DESIGNATION OF PAYMENTS TO TRUST FUND LIABILITIES
IN CHAPTER 11

A.

Judicial Solutions

There are three main judicial responses to chapter 11 debtors'
attempts to designate payments made from property of the estate to
trust fund liabilities. First, some cases hold that a tax payment re-

133. 124 CONG. REC. 32,417 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) and 124 CONG. REC.
34,017 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 6501, 6570.
134. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. The legislative history, supra note 133, makes clear that the determination is made
as of the date the bankruptcy case is commenced. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (7) (1988); see also
Whiting Pools, Inc. v. United States, 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.10 (1983) (dicta, suggesting the
possibility that trust funds may be traced to tangible assets held by the debtor prior to bankruptcy).
136. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2267. It has been reported that the IRS will "purse [sic] the
question" of whether the Begier rule applies to involuntary payments of trust fund taxes. IRS
Troubled By Rulings Subordinating Tax Penalty, Claims, Official Says, Daily Tax Report

(BNA) G-5 (Oct. 29, 1990) (comments of IRS Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel, General Litigation
Division, made on Oct. 26, 1990). One might also expect the Service to attempt to apply the
result in Begier to the postpetition situation if the debtor has made a prepetition partial payment
of trust fund taxes. The Service might argue that the prepetition voluntary payment of trust
fund taxes identified the account from which it was drawn as one containing all of the trust
funds due at the commencement of the case, in other words, that the "Begier payment" sufficiently met the tracing requirements with regard to the entire account.
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ceived from a chapter :11 debtor in a proceeding initiated by the debtor
is not received through court or administrative action resulting in the
actual seizure of property. Therefore, the payment is voluntary as a
matter of law.137 These cases distinguish Amos and O'Dell,-' and
analogize the voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors in
Muntwyler. :19
The cases hold that the fact that the debtor must make
payments pursuant to a plan of reorganization which complies with
Bankruptcy Code requirements does not constitute court action equivalent to a levy, judicial order, execution sale or judicial sale,140 largely
because the debtor in a voluntary chapter 11 case has a certain degree
of latitude as to how and when to pay the IRS.14 This approach
overlooks or misinterprets a portion of the original, universally accepted definition of involuntary payment which was set out as the
second prong of Amos. Amos stated that involuntary payments included ones "received . . . from a legal proceeding in which the Government [was] seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim
therefor."'- While this portion of the Amos definition of involuntary
payment may be mere dicta, erroneous or inapplicable to the chapter
11 situation, these cases nonetheless fail to apply it.14
On the opposite end of the voluntary-involuntary continuum are
the cases which hold that a payment made by a debtor in a chapter
11 proceeding is involuntary as a matter of law. In In re Ribs-R-Us,
Inc.,'144 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the debtor's
contention, based upon the first prong of Amos, that only payments
resulting from enforced collection measures leading to an actual seizure

137. See, e.g., It re Lifescape, Inc., 54 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); In re Tom
LeDuc Enters., Inc., 47 Bankr. 900 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
138. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
140. Lifescape, 54 Bankr. at 529.
141. Id.
142. Amos, 47 T.C. at 69. In Muotwyler, of course, the government was seeking to file a
claim, but it was not in a legal proceeding at the time. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1031-34.
Therefore, the Amos definition of involuntary was not met.
143. See also In re Hartley Plumbing Co., 32 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1983) (a chapter
11 case which relied on In re Frost, 19 Bankr. 804, 808-09 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 47
Bankr. 961 (D. Kan. 1985)). The bankruptcy court in Frost had held that payments in a chapter
13 case (in which a wage earner pays his debts over three years under a plan) were voluntary
because a chapter 13 petition can be filed only by a debtor and can be dismissed at any time
without notice to creditors. Frost, 19 Bankr. at 809. The district court reversed, correctly
applying the Amos-Muntwyler definition. Frost, 47 Bankr. at 964-65. Amazingly, the court in
Lifescape specifically criticized the district court in Frost for failing to follow Muntuyler, in the
process misreading the Amos-Muntwyler definition. Lifescape, 54 Bankr. at 529.
144. 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987).
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of property, such as a levy, are involuntary. 145 The court instead
examined the Bankruptcy Code restrictions imposed upon a chapter
11 debtor. It then concluded that, despite the chapter 11 debtor's
right to operate the business and to dispose of property in the ordinary
course of its business, the debtor must act as a fiduciary for the benefit
of its creditors. 146 Further, the court recognized that the debtor must
follow the terms of a confirmed plan, including payment of all seventh
priority tax claims within six years. 147 However, the court focused on
the fact that any bankruptcy proceeding was the last chance of a
debtor for a relatively ordered financial liquidation or rehabilitation
rather than an out-of-control financial debacle; therefore, to interpret
any payment made pursuant to a plan of reorganization as voluntary
would be inconsistent with the realities of bankruptcy.148
Ribs-R-Us, the debtor, argued that the provision of the Bankruptcy
Code giving a debtor six years to pay seventh priority taxes, 11
U.S.C. section 1129(a)(9)(C), created a federal policy which subordinated the competing federal policy of protecting the revenue as set
forth by I.R.C section 6672.149 However, the court could find no legislative history to support that view, nor could it find any specific
Bankruptcy Code provision permitting either a debtor or a court to
direct application of payments in a manner to preclude recourse against
responsible persons. 1 °
On the other hand, the court found that there was a federal policy
of protecting the revenue inherent in I.R.C. section 6672 in the context
of a chapter 11 reorganization. 151Cases holding that a bankruptcy court
lacks jurisdiction or authority to enjoin the IRS from pursuing the
one hundred percent penalty against responsible persons who were
not the debtors in the proceeding evidence this policy.152 Consequently,
the congressional policy of protecting the government's tax revenues
prevailed over any lesser bankruptcy policy, and there was no obstacle
to the IRS's sole power to allocate the involuntary chapter 11 payments

145. Id. at 202-03.
146. Id. at 203 (citing Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1963)).
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 203-04. The court specifically rejected the use of 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1), which
permits a bankruptcy court to determine a tax, as authority for the court to allocate the payments
in derogation of the policy underlying I.R.C. § 6672. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 204 n.4.
151. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203-04.
152. Id. at 204 (citing to United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.
1986)). In Huckabee, the debtor claimed that the responsible person would contribute the amount
of the 100% penalty to fund the reorganization absent the penalty. Huckabee, 783 F.2d at 1547.
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to non-trust fund liabilities. 1' Both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits subsequently adopted the "per se involuntary" holding and reasoning of
Ribs-R-Us. Within the continuum lie cases which hold that voluntariness is a
question of fact. 155 In In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning,'- the
Eleventh Circuit recognized the voluntary-involuntary distinction and
the conflicting precedent. The court attributed the conflicting decisions
to a policy conflict between the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code. 157 The Internal Revenue Code, on the one hand, imposes
liability upon employers and responsible persons and imposes a trust
upon withheld taxes to facilitate their collection. The policy of the

The debtor contended that the funds were necessary to a reorganization. Id.; see also Quattrone
Accountants, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 895 F.2d 921, 924-27 (3d Cir. 1990) (determination
of I.R.C. § 6672 liability of nondebtor does not pass jurisdictional test of being "related" to
bankruptcy); In re Brandt-Airflex Corp., 843 F.2d 90, 94-96 (2d Cir. 1988) (11 U.S.C. § 505
does not authorize the bankruptcy court to determine the tax liability of nondebtors); In re
LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc., 832 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1987) (anti-injunction provision of I.R.C. §
7421 prevents bankruptcy court from enjoining IRS assessment of 100% penalty against non-debtors).
153. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 204. Because the court decided the payments were involuntary
as a matter of law, it refused to consider whether the corporate principals were committed to
finance the reorganization only if the debtor were allowed to designate the payments. Id.
154. See In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987). In Technical
Knockout, the debtor attempted to designate, pursuant to motion, preconfirmation payments.
Id. at 799. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not have "equitable jurisdiction" to
order the IRS to apply the payment because to do so "could defeat the priority scheme established
by Congress." Id. at 803. The court failed to indicate how the proposed designation related to
the priority scheme or how designation could defeat the scheme.
In DuCharmes, the Sixth Circuit simply agreed with Ribs-R-Us and Technical Knockout
without detailed discussion. In re DuCharmes & Co., 852 F.2d 194, 196 (6th Cir. 1988).
See also In re Avildsen Tools & Machine, Inc., 794 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple,
J., concurring) (stating that payments made under the bankruptcy court's supervision were
involuntary); In re Professional Technical Servs., Inc., 94 Bankr. 578 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (adopting
the Ribs-R-Us holding and reasoning); In re Frost, 47 Bankr. 961 (D. Kan. 1985) (debtor's
payments to IRS pursuant to chapter 13 plan held to be involuntary); In re Mister Marvins,
Inc., 48 Bankr. 279 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (court ordered payment to IRS under chapter 11 held
to be involuntary).
155. In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d 223, 233 (1st Cir. 1989), affd, 110 S. Ct. 2139
(1990); In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated
and remandedfor considerationof mootness, 108 S. Ct. 1724 (1988), held not moot on remand,
861 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.), dismissed as moot, 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Kare Kemical,
Inc., 112 Bankr. 38, 40 (S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Hineline, 72 Bankr. 642, 644 (N.D. Ohio 1987);
In re B & P Enters., Inc., 67 Bankr. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986). See In re Franklin
Press, Inc., 52 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
156. 823 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1987).
157. Id. at 463-64.
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Internal Revenue Code is the collection of taxes and the maximization
of the public fisc.as On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code expresses
a preference for reorganization over liquidation because creditors are
likely to receive a larger distribution in a reorganization and reorganization preserves the entity's economic life. 159 The court found that the

failure to allow a debtor to designate payments to trust fund liabilities
is detrimental to a reorganization because the corporate officers (who
are responsible persons), who control the corporation, will prefer a
corporate liquidation in chapter 7 to a chapter 11 because the corporation will likely pay all priority taxes in full.- °
Consequently, according to the A & B Heating court, the designation question in a chapter 11 case should be decided on a case-by-case
basis.16 ' The court identified a number of factors which the lower court
was instructed to consider in determining whether the payment was
voluntary or involuntary. 16? Among the factors were whether prebankruptcy collection measures had been taken, whether the case was a
liquidation or a reorganization, whether there were special circumstances, and most importantly, "whether the proposed plan [was]
merely a stopgap scheme to hold the taxing authority at bay with
little chance that the debtor [would] fulfill its obligation under the
plan."'6 Interestingly, the A & B Heating court did not mention the
reorganization's dependence upon the participation of the responsible
persons, the only factor directly related to the Bankruptcy Code policy
of encouraging reorganizations, as a factor for the lower court to
consider.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Energy Resources also held
that the designation issue was a question of fact. In reaching that
conclusion, the court borrowed from both Ribs-R-Us and A & B Heat6 4 First, the court found that the IRS could call a chapter 11 tax
ing.1
158.

Id. at 465.

159.

Id.

160. Id. (quoting Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdictionand the Power to Enjoin the IRS,
70 MINN. L. REV. 1279, 1299-1300 (1986)).

161. Id. (quoting B & P Enters., 67 Bankr. at 183).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 466. The court adopted the case-by-case analysis of factors proposed in B & P
Enters., 67 Bankr. at 184. Id. at 465-66. The court refused to adopt B & P Enters.' restrictive
test, which placed the burden of proof upon the debtor to show special circumstances warranting
the allocation. Id. at 465 n.4. Instead, the court instructed the lower court to consider the plan
as a whole. Id. at 465-66. In the light of the court's recognition that the bankruptcy judge
previously had considered and passed upon the feasibility of the plan, as he was required to do
under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988), see A & B Heating, 823 F.2d at 466, it is unclear what,
if anything, the "most important" factor adds to the plan confirmation criteria.
164. Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 227, 233.
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payment involuntary for the purpose of applying its own rules or
regulations.'"' It reached that finding by identifying those characteristics of a chapter 11 proceeding which would make a related tax payment involuntary, as noted in Ribs-R-Us.' 66 The court next identified
those characteristics favoring application of a voluntary label.'67 However, the First Circuit in Energy Resources did not find it necessary
to weigh the voluntary-involuntary characteristics because it did not
find the Service's view or its internal rules to be clearly unreasonable.' Therefore, the court held that the payments were involuntary,
and that the debtor could not dictate the application of payments to
the Service.' ":
This did not end the analysis. Having decided that the payments
were involuntary, the court ruled that a bankruptcy court has the
power to order the IRS to override its own internal rules and policies
of payment application.170 The court gave six reasons. First, a bankruptcy court has the power to issue any order appropriate to carry
out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 1 Permitting the bankruptcy court the power to assure the responsible persons that the
trust fund debt (and thus their liability) would be extinguished first
might diminish the IRS's chances of being paid in full on all its claims.
However, it would increase the possibility that the reorganization
would be successful by ensuring the cooperation, and perhaps the
financial assistance, of the responsible persons.'7 2 Second, bankruptcy
courts can apply payments among particular claims of the same creditor outside of the tax context, and Amos specifically refrained from
deciding whether the IRS would have the same rights to apply payments if the reorganization might affect other creditors., 3 Third, the
court could find nothing in the Bankruptcy Code which would limit
the court's power to allocate a tax payment, considering the "compromise nature of chapter 11's tax debt policy.' ' 174 Fourth, the bankruptcy court was better fit to apply the court's balancing test on a
case-by-case basis than was the IRS. 175 Fifth, the IRS could not over-

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 227-30.
Id. at 228-29. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48 for a discussion of factors.
Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 229.
Id. at 230. The court found this to be the applicable standard. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988)).
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 231; Amos, 47 T.C. at 70 n.5.
Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 231.
Id.
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ride by an internal rule the bankruptcy court's powers. 176 Sixth, the
IRS's allocation policy, according to the court, ensured that the trust
funds would be paid last and thus represented an attempt to use the
one hundred percent penalty to collect total tax debts, not merely
trust fund taxes. 177 In contrast, under the debtor's view, the IRS
would release the responsible person only to the extent that the trust
fund taxes were paid, and 'the IRS would be no worse off with regard
to the remaining non-trust fund debt than if the entire debt had been
of non-trust fund nature. 178
Having found that the bankruptcy court had the power to allocate
the payments, the court required the bankruptcy courts to consider
the plan as a whole, and to justify the increased risk that the IRS
would not collect the total tax debt against the offsetting increased
likelihood of rehabilitation (payment to general creditors who otherwise might not receive payment in a liquidation). 179 In both of the
cases involved in Energy Resources, the First Circuit found that a
third party's infusion of capital was funding and facilitating the plan
of reorganization, and therefore, the likelihood of rehabilitation justified the increased risk to the IRS. 18
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the First Circuit in
Energy Resources, adopting much of the same general reasoning, but
with several significant differences."" First, the Court stated that the
bankruptcy court has the authority to order a designation of payments
to trust fund liabilities whether or not the payments are involuntary. 182

176. Id. at 232.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 233.
179. Id. at 234.
180. Id. See also Franklin Press, 52 Bankr. at 152 (establishing voluntariness of payment
from a voluntary, third party guarantee in securing financing for a reorganization). The court
in Franklin Pressrelied on In re Hartley Plumbing Co., 32 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1983).
Id. Hartley Plumbing relied on another case which was later reversed. Hartley Plumbing, 32
Bankr. at 8 (citing to In re Frost, 19 Bankr. 804 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 47 Bankr. 961
(D. Kan. 1985)). See supra note 143.
The court in Kare Kemical went even further by finding that the bankruptcy court could
adopt the debtor's proposed allocation to trust fund taxes in a liquidating chapter 11 case where
no general creditors would receive any payments. Kare Kemical, 112 Bankr. at 41. The court
in Kare Kemical affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the responsible person's actions
in attempting to maximize the value of the debtor's assets for the benefit of the IRS made the
payments voluntary. Id. at 40-41.
181. Energy Resources, 110 S.Ct. at 2141-42.
182. Id. Because the Court, unlike the First Circuit, did not even consider whether the
payments were voluntary or involuntary, in a proper case,. a bankruptcy court might be able
to override a chapter 11 debtor's "voluntary" designation, if it is still possible to make a voluntary
designation.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Second, the Court found the trust fund designation appropriate under
the bankruptcy court's authority both to permit the inclusion in a plan
of "any . . .appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable
provisions of this title," and to "issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the
Bankruptcy Code. '83Third, the Court rejected the government's claims
that the designation provision violated the Bankruptcy Code's priority
and non-discharge provisions. - The Court found nothing in the Bankruptcy Code which would specifically protect the IRS from the risk
of plan failure.'- Finally, the Court briefly examined the policy underlying I.R.C. section 6672 to provide an additional source for the collection of taxes and determined that the designation orders were, in fact,
in accord with that policy because the debtor would pay trust fund
taxes first.1s6
On its face, the Supreme Court appears to have narrowed the legal
standard for permitting designation from that of "increased likelihood
of rehabilitation"1s7 to one of "necessary to the success of a reorganization plan."'I' Because the Court simply affirmed the First Circuit
without any further discussion of the apparent new standard, s9 it is
unclear whether the Court actually adopted a new standard or believed
that the two standards were identical in practice. However, the facts
of one of the two consolidated cases in Energy Resources suggest that
the results under the two standards are identical.
In United States v. Energy Resources Co., the bankruptcy court
confirmed a reorganization plan which placed all of the debtor's assets,
except for one division, into a special liquidating trust to pay its debts,
including taxes, over five years.' 90 More than one year after the plan
was confirmed, the trustee of the liquidating trust asked the bankruptcy court to order the Service to apply his $280,000 tax payment
to trust fund liabilities.""9 The trustee negotiated this arrangement
with a former officer in return for a $14,000 payment by that officer
to the liquidating trust. 9 2 While the bankruptcy court ruled that the
183. Id. at 2142 (quoting -1 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 105(a) (1988)).
184. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 726, 1129(a) (1988); see also supra notes 81-88, 93 and
accompanying text.
185. Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142-43. Apparently the feasibility test of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(11) is the only protection against plan failure. See supranote 163 and accompanying text.
186. Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2143.
187. See Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 234.
188. Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142.
189. See id. at 2142-43.
190. See Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 226-27.
191. In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702, 704 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
192. Id.
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trustee was entitled to designate the payment to trust fund taxes
because the payment was voluntary, 193 it is difficult to see how the
designation met the Supreme Court's "necessary to the success of a
reorganization" standard. The estate was benefited only by the amount
of the officer's contribution, $14,000, a relatively insignificant amount
in that multimillion dollar bankruptcy case. Moreover, the designation
occurred long after the reorganization plan had been negotiated and
confirmed by the bankruptcy court. It appears, therefore, that the
Supreme Court treated its new "necessary" standard as identical to
the standard of "increased likelihood of rehabilitation."
B.

Critique of Judicial Solutions and Approaches

Both the judicial solutions and approaches, and the rationale of the
litigants, are subject to criticism. As pointed out above, the "per se
voluntary" rule overlooks a significant portion of the definition of involuntary set forth in Amos and Muntwyler, and thus is without firm
judicial precedent.'94 The "per se involuntary" rule of Ribs-R-Us195 and
its progeny was defective as well, for it disregarded the independent
role of the bankruptcy courts to adjust debtor-creditor relationships,
including those with the IRS. Therefore, the rule reduced the role of
the court to enforcing the Service's designation.
The Supreme Court cut through the strict voluntary-involuntary
dichotomy by adopting the First Circuit's approach of focusing upon
the bankruptcy court's power to override the internal rules of the
IRS. In doing so, the Court resolved the apparent policy conflict
between the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code in favor
of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor and the responsible persons. In
most cases, the "necessary to a successful reorganization" test will
result in confirmation of a plan containing a trust fund designation
provision. A third party's voluiitary contribution to fund a reorganization must be contingent upon the inclusion of a designation provision
in a plan, and the contribution must be necessary to the success of
the plan. Thus, in practice, the results of the case-by-case approach
of Energy Resources will likely closely resemble those of the "per se
voluntary" rule, except that the ultimate power to designate now
96
resides in the bankruptcy court.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 706.
See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
See Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142. If the designation provision is necessary

to a successful reorganization, it appears that it would be an abuse of discretion for a bankruptcy
court not to approve the provision. See id.
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The concept that a designation provision can facilitate a chapter
11 reorganization is difficult to fault. A responsible person in control
of a chapter 11 debtor through stock ownership could be willing to
inject cash into the enterprise in lieu of simply paying the funds to
the IRS, if a designation provision eliminates the person's risk of
ultimate one hundred percent penalty liability. In effect, a cash contribution under those circumstances serves double duty: it funds the
reorganization and thus increases the value of stock in the corporate
debtor, and through the designation provision, it provides relief of
some of the risk of responsible person liability. Thus, the responsible
person is willing to make a larger contribution to fund the reorganization due to the presence of the designation provision. The same holds
true if a third party provides the cash to the debtor. Presumably, the
responsible person/shareholder would give up to the third party a
larger share of equity in the corporate debtor in return for the designation provision proposed by the debtor, increasing the third party's
197
willingness to risk its funds in the reorganization.
However, in another sense, a designation of tax payments to trust
fund liability also burdens the reorganization of a chapter 11 debtor
by decreasing the likelihood that the responsible person will ultimately
bear the economic burden for the trust fund taxes. If no designation
provision existed and if the payments were involuntary (i.e., trust
fund taxes were to be paid last in time), then the government could
collect from the responsible persons (and the statute of limitations on
refunds might have run) before the trust fund taxes were payable
under the plan, and the Service would abate those taxes imposed upon
the corporate debtor.19s Thus, the presence of a designation provision

197. There would seem to be no reason why a responsible person who is not a shareholder
or creditor of a corporate debtor would have anything proper to offer a third party in return
for a designation provision. In such a case, a bankruptcy court might examine the designation
provision in the light of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1988) (the plan must be proposed in good faith
and not by any means forbidden by law), or might simply find that, under the facts and
circumstances, the designation provision is not "necessary to a successful reorganization."
198. See supra note 32. The weight of authority holds that a responsible person who pays
the 100% penalty has no right to recover the amount of his payment from the employer. See
Sinder v. United States, 655 F.2d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 1981); In re All-Star Sports, Inc., 78 Bankr.
281 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987); In re Ace Finance Co., 59 Bankr. 667, 670 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986);
In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 45 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); Rebelle v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 49, 51 (M.D. La. 1984); Rice v. Pearce, 574 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.
Iowa 1983); Moats v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 1330, 1341-42 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Hanhauser
v. United States, 85 F.R.D. 89, 91-92 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Spivak v. United States, 254 F. Supp.
517, 524 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affjd, 370 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967).
But see Reid v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Miss. 1983).
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in a confirmed plan could actually increase the reorganized debtor's
total tax burden.
Another difficulty with the Supreme Court's approach is that it
tends to reduce the designation issue to a mere accounting entry on
the government's "books." The Supreme Court determined that the
designation orders protected trust fund revenues by requiring that
the trust fund taxes be credited first, at the risk of the later nonreceipt
of total tax debts.19 This argument fails to recognize the damage to
the public fise - someone must make up a shortfall in revenues,
whether trust fund or non-trust fund. The Court focused only on the
policy underlying I.R.C. section 6672 and failed to give weight to the
complex interlocking statutory scheme and underlying policy regarding
collection of trust fund liabilities. The Court should have considered
section 6672 as a tool for enforcing compliance with the employer's
obligation to deduct and withhold its employees' income and social
security taxes,m together with section 7501, which imposes a trust
upon these funds, 20' section 7202, which imposes criminal liability upon
persons who fail to comply with these provisions,202 and the fact that
a claim in bankruptcy against a debtor based upon the one hundred
2
percent penalty is a seventh priority claim which is nondischargeable. 03
The Supreme Court in Energy Resources simply glossed over this
statutory scheme.
Assuming a bankruptcy court's determination that a designation
provision is necessary to the success of a particular reorganization,
the mechanical issues raised above beg the public policy question which
the Supreme Court failed to directly address: should the court permit
the responsible person and the chapter 11 debtor (and perhaps a third
party) to make this arrangement in the light of the strong congressional
tax collection policy, given that the government is forced to be a
creditor in the proceeding and is not a willing participant to the arrangement? Since the Court's implicit answer to this question is yes,
any change in the law now clearly will have to come from Congress. 2°4

199.
200.

See Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142-43; Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 232.
I.R.C. § 6672.

201.

I.R.C. § 7501.

202. I.R.C. § 7202.
203. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7)(C), 523(a)(1)(A) (1988). See Comment, Favoring Collection of
Taxes Over Bankruptcy Discharge in Section 6672 Actions, 25 WILLAIETE L. REV. 633
(1989); see also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 282 (1978) (liability under I.R.C. § 6672
held to be nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act).
204. See supra note 94 for a discussion of proposed legislation to the Bankruptcy Code to

permit the government to preserve alternative sources of collection.
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More fundamentally, now a need for congressional intervention exists
to prevent the next round of inevitable litigation over the issue of
when a designation provision is "necessary" to the success of a reorganization. The Court offered no clear guidelines to assist the lower
courts in making this determination. A compromise legislative approach which would create needed certainty in this area is proposed
below.
The underlying economic issue in these cases is the identification
of the appropriate person to bear the risk of plan failure - the government or the responsible person. The responsible person, and therefore the plan proponent, desires an early exoneration from the one
hundred percent penalty. Conversely, the government wants to keep
the responsible person liable until the debtor makes all tax payments
in the reorganization. No court has ever considered any solution to
this deadlock other than a complete victory for one litigant or another.
Apparently, none of the parties to litigation of this issue has proposed
an intermediate solution. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Su20 5
preme Court awarded total victory to the debtor.
However, there are provisions contained in the Bankruptcy Code,
its legislative history, and case law which dictate a different result
from that found by the Supreme Court or put forth by the parties in
the litigated cases. 2 6 At least two separate lines of reasoning support

205. Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2143. Some additional arguments not addressed by
the cases are:
a. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d) forbids a court from confirming a plan if the principal purpose of
the plan is tax avoidance. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d) (1988). The government has the burden of proof.
Id. While it would be difficult for the government to prevail on this theory in most instances,
in part due to the burden of proof, this provision might be successful in attacking certain cases
where other arguments have failed. See, e.g., Kare Kemical, 112 Bankr. at 38, in which a
corporation liquidating under chapter 11 was permitted to designate its seventh priority tax
payment to trust fund liabilities, despite having insufficient funds to pay the IRS in full or to
pay anything to creditors junior to the IRS. It is at least arguable that under these facts and
circumstances, there was no "successful reorganization," (or, for that matter, any "reorganization") and, therefore, that the designation provision could not have been "necessary to a successful
reorganization."
b. If the responsible person is not a shareholder or creditor of the debtor, the plan might
not be proposed in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1988) (requiring that the plan has
been proposed in good faith); see also supra note 197.
206. Since these provisions are inconsistent with a designation provision in a plan, the
designation provisions are not permissible under either 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b) or 11 U.S.C. §
105(a), cited by the Court. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)
(power of § 105 must be exercised within confines of Code); In re Morristown & E.R.R., 885
F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1989) (§ 105 cannot create new substantive rights); In re NWFX, Inc.,
864 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1989) (in accord); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) (in accord);
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the conclusion that each payment of taxes of seventh priority made
pursuant to a chapter 11 plan must consist of a ratable share of trust
fund and non-trust fund taxes, in proportion to the ratio of aggregate
trust fund liabilities to aggregate non-trust fund liabilities.
The first line of reasoning is based on treatment of priority claims
in bankruptcies. Unlike general unsecured claims and secured claims,
which must be grouped into classes for purposes of voting upon a
chapter 11 plan, 2 07 seventh priority tax claims may not be classified
in a plan. Instead, the debtor must pay these claims in accordance
with Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(9)(C). The section specifies that
the holder of a claim must receive "deferred cash payments," including
interest, over a period not exceeding six years after assessment. The
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code clarifies that a governmental unit may have more than one claim within the same priority. 2°8
non-trust fund taxes
Consequently, claims for the trust fund taxes 20and
9
may constitute at least two separate claims.

The effect of a provision designating that trust fund taxes be
deemed paid before non-trust fund taxes is judicially to establish a
priority within a priority for the trust fund taxes. 210 Substantial,
longstanding authority exists under the bankruptcy law that the courts
must strictly construe the statutory bankruptcy priorities Congress

United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986) (in accord); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank,
719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983) (§ 105 must be exercised in a manner consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). See also supra note 183 and accompanying
text.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (1988). See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988) (acceptance of plan
determined by classes). Claims in the same class must be treated alike. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4)
(1988). See also infra note 213.
208. "Tax claims entitled to priority under section 507(a)(6) of different govenmental units
may not be contained in one class although all claims of one such unit may be combined. ..."
124 CONG. REc. 32,406 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) and 124 CONG. REC. 34,006 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,
6472, 6542.
209. There might, in fact, be more than two claims. If the existence of separate claims is
determined by the different subparagraphs of § 507(a)(7), there might be separate claims for
income taxes due within three years, § 507(a)(7)(A), trust fund taxes, § 507(a)(7)(C), and the
employer's share of social security taxes due within three years, § 507(a)(7)(D). 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(7)(A), (C), (D) (1988). Alternatively, there could be a separate claim for each separate
Internal Revenue Code provision giving rise to a claim. For purposes of this analysis, it is
unnecessary to consider whether there are more than two separate seventh priority claims, one
for trust fund taxes, and one for non-trust fund taxes.
210. Similarly, permitting the IRS to designate involuntary payments in chapter 11 under
prior law as non-trust fund taxes establishes a priority within a priority for non-trust fund taxes.
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established 21' and that the courts may not set priorities without clear
statutory authority.212 A bankruptcy court, therefore, has no authority
to fix different priorities for two different claims of the same priority
classification.213 All claims which fall within the seventh priority must
be accorded the same treatment, including claims of state taxing authorities and the IRS. 214 The designation provision approved by the
Supreme Court contravenes this longstanding authority.
If the IRS combines the trust fund and non-trust fund tax claims
into one claim,215 then the court must treat them alike. If a designation
provision requires that the payments of non-trust fund taxes be commenced after completion of the payments of trust fund taxes, one is
led to the conclusion that the two claims have been combined. Whether

211. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952); In re Amarex, Inc., 853 F.2d 1526, 1530
(10th Cir. 1988); Trustees of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin's, Inc., 789 F.2d 98 (2d Cir.
1986); In re Pulaski Highway Express, Inc., 57 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re
American Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp., 171 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd, 280
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960).
212. United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959); In re Lorber Indus.,
Inc., 675 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1976);
Standard Oil v. Kurtz, 330 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1964); In re Great Northeastern Lumber &
Millwork Corp., 64 Bankr. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc., 65
Bankr. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986); In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1985); In re P.J. Nee Co., 36 Bankr. 609 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983).
213. See United States v. Kalishman, 346 F.2d 514 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003
(1965); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Killoren, 119
F.2d 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 640 (1941); In re Grosso, 51 Bankr. 266 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1984); In re Wilnor Drilling, Inc., 29 Bankr. 727 (S.D. Ill. 1982); In re Wil-Low
Cafeterias, 35 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). There is limited authority permitting a court to
alter the timing of priority claims if necessary for equitable public policy reasons. See In re
Jewish Memorial Hosp., 13 Bankr. 417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court permitted delay of payments of priority expenses where hospital, which was essential to health and safety of community,
otherwise would be forced to close its doors). In Jewish Memorial Hosp., it was not clear
whether the payment of all claims of the same priority were delayed, but at least some other
claimants in addition to the complaining claimant were delayed. Jewish Memorial Hosp., 13
Bankr. at 418. The standard in Jewish Memorial Hosp. is clearly much more restrictive than
that announced by the Supreme Court in Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2139, and appears
to be reserved for extraordinary cases.
214. See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72 (1936) (under former Bankruptcy Act, all taxes,
whether of the United States, state, county, district or municipality, were placed on a parity);
In re Revco, D.S., Inc., 91 Bankr. 777, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (to pay seventh priority
state trust fund taxes prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization would prejudice other
claimants holding seventh priority claims, as well as creditors holding claims of higher priority);
In re Penn-Mahoning Mining, Inc., 45 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984) (no separate priorities
exist within § 507(a)(7)).
215. See supra note 208.
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the claims are combined or separate, the court must treat them alike.
Therefore, each deferred cash payment of seventh priority taxes must
consist 6 of a proportionate share of trust fund and non-trust fund
taxes.

21

The second line of reasoning is based upon cases which require
that the debtor make the "deferred cash payments" by periodic payments of principal and interest. 217 Although the legislative history requires payment of the seventh priority taxes "in installments over a
it is not clear whether the
period not to exceed 6 years . . . ,,,218
debtor must make equal installments or if the installments must be
made monthly. Most of the cases considering this question have required equal monthly payments with the possibility of a longer pay219
ment interval if the debtor demonstrates special or unusual facts.
Given a requirement of equal periodic payments for seventh priority
claims, it is clear that a designation provision deviates by permitting
the non-trust fund payments to begin in mid-plan. The non-trust fund
payments would begin, for example, in year three of a six-year-plan,
and would, therefore, fail the periodic installment test.- ° Under this
analysis as well, each equal payment should consist of a proportionate
share of the trust fund and non-trust fund claims.Y

216. See also In re Parker, 21 Bankr. 692, 694 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) C"'[D]eferred' [in chapter
13] means after the effective date of the plan, not postponed until after the payment of any
other claims covered by the plan.").
217. In re Arrow Air, Inc., 101 Bankr. 332, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Mahoney, 80 Bankr.
197 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987); In re Inventive Packaging Corp., 81 Bankr. 74 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1987); In re Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 71 Bankr. 300 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1987).
218. 124 CONG. REC. 32,418 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) and 124 CONG. REC.
34,017 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 6502, 6572.
219. See supra note 217. But see In re Snowden's Landscaping Co., 110 Bankr. 56 (Bankr.
S.D. Ala. 1990). In Snowden, the court permitted quarterly rather than monthly payments,
undoubtedly within the court's discretion. Id. at 61. More significantly, however, Snowden
permitted the debtor to pay all seventh priority tax claims over 5 years in graduated installments
of 5% in year 1, 15% in year 2, and 26% in each of years 3, 4 and 5. Id. at 59. While Snowden
certainly rejects the previously well understood definition of "deferred cash payments" as equal
payments, the case does not undercut the concept of equal treatment for equal priority claims.
All of the seventh priority claims, as well as the junior general unsecured claims, were treated
alike. Id. at 59-60. Interestingly, Snowden also adopted the general approach of allowing the
special treatment because it was necessary to a successful reorganization. See id. at 61.
220. See supra note 217. The Snowden court would not save the provision because the
timing of payment of claims in the hypothetical plan would be different. Snowden, 110 Bankr.
at 56. See supra note 219.
221. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988) (requiring that claims within a particular class be paid
pro rata in a chapter 7 liquidation case if there are inadequate funds to pay the holders of claims
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INTERACTION BETWEEN TRUST FUND TRACING AND
DESIGNATION ISSUES

The implication of Begier's "reasonable assumptions" at the commencement of a chapter 11 case probably limits the designation of
payments to trust fund liabilities, permitted under Energy Resources.
A chapter 11 debtor in possession or a trustee is not free to designate
the payment within a plan of funds which are not property of the
estate. According to Begier, the IRS may have a right to the funds
traced to a trust under the "reasonable assumption" that funds in the
debtor's accounts are withheld taxes belonging to the trust fund. Consequently, the designation issue addressed in Energy Resources may
only arise to the extent that funds deemed held in trust under "reasonable assumptions" are insufficient to satisfy the debtor's trust fund
liability.
On the other hand, Energy Resources and Begier, in tandem, do
afford a debtor in chapter 11 considerable flexibility in benefiting the
responsible person. The debtor can make a non-avoidable payment
prior to bankruptcy, or alternatively can designate that tax payments
first be applied to trust fund liabilities.23 In fact, because a debtor is
likely to have an immediate need for working capital, the well-counseled potential chapter 11 debtor will probably find a voluntary prebankruptcy payment of trust funds, like that made in Begier, to be
highly undesirable. Consequently, Begier is best understood as a chapter 7 case. In effect, Begier permits a corporate debtor on the eve of
filing for chapter 7 liquidation to designate a payment to trust fund
liabilities simply by the act of payment alone. Such a payment will,
of course, commensurately relieve the responsible person of liability
for the one hundred percent penalty, and override the priorities of
chapter 7.24 In fact, such a course of action could be so attractive to
a corporate debtor that it might attempt to liquidate its tangible assets

of a particular class in full). See supra note 88. The theory behind this provision certainly should
be adopted in a chapter 11 liquidation. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988) (requiring each
claimant to receive property with a value of at least what would have been realized under
chapter 7).
222. Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2258. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
223. In a chapter 11 case, the debtor will generally wish to prevent the impressing of a
trust on its accounts in order to preserve its designation option. Even under "reasonable assumptions," a debtor may easily, intentionally or unintentionally, manage its cash in such a manner
as to avoid the tracing of withheld funds to a commingled account existing at the time the
bankruptcy case commences. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
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to the extent necessary to satisfy its trust fund liabilities for the
benefit of the responsible person.
The Service, conversely, probably would not wish to apply such a
payment to trust fund liabilities, but would have no choice under its
own declared policy of honoring taxpayers' designations of voluntary
6
payments 25 and under the established principles of Muntwyler.2 Similarly, after commencement of a chapter 7 case, the Service would
probably not wish to have a trust imposed under "reasonable assumptions" upon monies in the debtor's general accounts, since to do so
would relieve the responsible person from his statutory guaranty under
I.R.C. section 6672 and would leave the IRS with a noncollectible
claim for non-trust fund liabilities. The corporate debtor and responsible person, of course, probably would wish to see the trust imposed.
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Energy Resources, therefore,
it is painfully clear that the IRS lost, not won, in Begier.
The recent decisions have further potential implications in the area
of IRS collection activities. If the Service seizes a bank account of a
debtor who has both trust fund and non-trust fund liabilities, traditional principles would appear to dictate that the "payment" is involuntary, and the IRS will apply the funds in the account to non-trust
fund liabilities. If, however, the debtor can trace the funds in the
account by "reasonable assumptions" to trust funds, the court may
force the IRS to reapply the payment to trust fund liabilities when
bankruptcy is later filed, preventing a potential preference. Although
the facts of Begier concerned a prepetition voluntary payment, since
the same "reasonable assumptions" apply both prepetition and postpetition,2 any funds held in a commingled account are trust funds to the
extent of the original trust funds which can be traced into the account.
Thus, it is at least arguable that Begier changed the common law
tracing rule as to involuntary payments (i.e., seizures) as well as to
voluntary payments of trust fund liabilities. 229 Moreover, in cases
where other creditors have significant claims ahead of the IRS in
priority, the Service may wish to apply all involuntary payments to
trust fund liabilities, regardless of tracing, where bankruptcy is imminent. 30 Thus, the distinction between the IRS treatment of voluntary

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
987 (9th

See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
See Begier, 110 S. Ct. at 2266.
See, e.g., In re R & T Roofing Structures & Commercial Framing, Inc., 887 F.2d 981,
Cir. 1989) (rejecting the arguments finally adopted in Begier and relying on the common

law of trusts, which was rejected in Begier).
230.

See supra note 136.
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and involuntary payments prior to bankruptcy may begin to evaporate.
The ultimate effect of Energy Resources and Begier may be the evisceration of the voluntary-involuntary distinction in the bankruptcy
context.
VI.

CONCLUSION'

Given the likelihood of further litigation in the designation area,
particularly with regard to the standard of "necessary to the success
of a reorganization plan," it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court
in Energy Resources left the application of the "necessity" standard
somewhat vague. Although the Court discarded the unfruitful voluntary-involuntary analysis in the bankruptcy context, it failed to address
the established bankruptcy law requiring a proportionate payment of
claims, in this case trust fund and non-trust fund taxes, within the
same bankruptcy priority.2'
Congress should address the choice between the pro rata alternative or the new status quo. However, it should be recognized that
the Bankruptcy Code already balances the policies behind payment of
these tax claims in a detailed and certain manner.- 2 At this stage,
congressional affirmation of this fact will eliminate the unseemly use
of responsible person liability as a "bargaining chip" in reorganization
negotiations by an individual who may have broken the criminal tax
law. Congress should enact legislation clarifying the proportionate
payment of equal priority tax claims in order to return the balance
lost by Energy Resources. Such legislation is a workable compromise
between the apparently per se "necessity" rule of Energy Resources
and the previously proposed legislation (which would permit a government to apply payments of taxes in bankruptcy as it saw fit).With regard to the voluntary payment of "trust funds" prior to
bankruptcy, the Supreme Court's decision in Begier questionably used
the legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to interpret I.R.C.
section 7501, originally enacted in 1934, creating a new form of "trust"
free of the common law rules of tracing. While on the surface Begier
appears to be a major victory in this area for the Service, in fact,
due to the impact of Energy Resources, Begier's application will generally be confined to chapter 7 cases, where it will be used to minimize
the liability of responsible persons for the one hundred percent penalty.

231.
232.
233.

Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2139.
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
See supra note 94.
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Begier will "invisibly boomerang" to the detriment of the Service
and the public fise.
The real "winner" in Begier was, again, the responsible person.
While both Begier and Energy Resources undercut the one hundred
percent penalty by permitting its use as a collection device to be
circumvented, the real "loser" in these cases was probably the traditional voluntary-involuntary distinction. The practical effect of these
cases may be the elimination of that dichotomy in the bankruptcy
context, with the courts directing the application of payments made
in bankruptcy and the debtor effectively designating the application
of prebankruptcy "payments" arising as a result of the involuntary
seizure of its property.

234.

See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[the

Court's] sporadic omnipotence in a field beset with invisible boomerangs").
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